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This paper employs industry-level U.S. Census data from 1980-2000 to assess the
aggregate effects of racial diversity. While most international accounts find that diver-
sity reduces productivity, I argue that the U.S. experience is more nuanced. Unqualified
statements about the costs and merits of diversity are unwarranted, as racial hetero-
geneity increases productivity within many, but not all, industries. Sectors employing a
large number of workers responsible for creative decision-making and customer service
experience gains from diversity, while industries characterized by high levels of group
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1 Introduction
The United States grew increasingly diverse between 1980 and 2000 as Whites declined
from 83% to 73% of the labor force. Many states are reconsidering their affirmative action
policies while the federal government reevaluates immigration and citizenship statutes. Un-
fortunately, we do not yet fully understand the aggregate effects of diversity. International
empirical analyses often argue that racial (or ethnic) heterogeneity hinders macroeconomic
growth and development by fostering conflict, corruption, political instability, and competi-
tive rent-seeking. Many top U.S. business executives reject these views, however, and claim
that individuals from varied backgrounds bring unique approaches to problem solving and
complement each other in production. Several academic analyses echo these sentiments.
This paper adds to the debate on the costs and benefits of diversity by building upon the
traditional economic growth and development framework to measure racial diversity’s net
effect on productivity within sectors of the United States.
My methodology advances the existing literature by addressing two limitations of prior
studies. First, although cross-country evidence for the costs of diversity is clear, the United
States may be especially effective in managing diversity. This paper will determine whether
the U.S. experience differs from international accounts. Second, typical international growth
analyses measure aggregate outcomes for countries but fail to address differences in marginal
effects that could exist across sectors of the economy. I depart from this strategy by analyzing
industrial performance across U.S. states. To begin, I measure racial diversity by using
decennial Census data to construct fractionalization indices for state-industry cells between
1980 and 2000. I then employ two stage weighted least squares regressions with fixed effects
to estimate diversity’s industry-specific influence on average wages paid to workers — a proxy
for labor productivity in the absence of observed output per worker measures.
Unqualified statements regarding the costs and merits of diversity are unwarranted, as
racial heterogeneity increases productivity within most, but not all, U.S. industries. These
results are robust to controls for individual-level heterogeneity, state-specific trends, industry-
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specific trends, and supply factors. Prior academic research, anecdotes from political events,
and the sector-specific coefficients in this paper provide intuition about the industrial char-
acteristics that determine whether diversity leads to economic gains or losses. I use the
U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET Consortium data to show that industries heavily reliant
upon creative decision-making, problem solving, and customer service benefit from diver-
sity. In contrast, sectors characterized by high levels of group or team work experience
losses, which suggests that heterogeneity encumbers common action. The results therefore
reconcile competing literatures by recognizing both the costs and benefits of diversity.
2 Motivation
Do racially diverse environments generate net economic gains or losses? International growth
economists typically find evidence for the latter. Easterly and Levine’s (1997) seminal inves-
tigation argues that “A movement from complete heterogeneity to complete homogeneity is
associated with an income increase of 3.8 times.” To them, diversity increases polarization,
facilitates competitive rent-seeking between groups, and promotes growth-reducing politi-
cal policies.1 A number of social scientists have argued that diversity also conflicts with
common action, and that heterogeneous societies tend to oppose wealth redistribution and
public goods provision.2 Others find evidence that diversity escalates corruption and political
instability.3
Many top U.S. executives, in contrast, instead argue that a racially diverse workforce
bolsters productivity. In the late 1990s, the University of Michigan began defending the
constitutionality of its affirmative action admissions policies in a series of well-publicized
court cases. In October 2000, executives from thirty Fortune 500 companies united to file
1Recent work by Alesina et al. (2003) provides a more detailed examination of diversity with similar
results.
2See Poterba (1997), Alesina et al. (1999), Gilens (1999), Luttmer (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004),
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Caselli and Coleman (2002) provides an important theoretical model to
descibe greed-motivated conflict between ethnic groups.
3See Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Fukuyama (1999).
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an amicus brief supporting the school. The brief contends “A diverse group of individuals
educated in a cross-cultural environment has the ability to facilitate unique and creative
approaches to problem-solving arising from the integration of different perspectives,” and
that “such individuals are better able to develop products and services that appeal to a
variety of consumers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to these consumers.” These
anecdotal claims do find support in academic literature. In psychology, Campbell (1960)
argues “persons who have been thoroughly exposed to two or more cultures seem to have
an advantage in the range of hypotheses they are apt to consider, and through this means,
in the frequency of creative innovation.” Similarly, Simonton (1999) maintains, “creativity
is favored by an intellect that has been enriched with diverse experiences and perspectives...
It is as if the mere exposure to different lifestyles and divergent values enables individuals
to expand the range and originality of their ideational variations.”4
Empirical, qualitative, and anecdotal evidence suggests that an ideal theoretical model
of diversity and productivity should reconcile the costs and benefits of diversity within a
single production function. Assume an economy is composed of Li workers from groups
i = 1...N . The number of groups (N) is fixed, and group i comprises a fraction of the
labor force equal to θi. A generic function C (L1, L2, ..., LN) measures the fraction of output
remaining after firms (and society) suffer costs associated with employing individuals from
disparate groups. These costs might reflect communication and conflict costs, diversion from
productive activity, and/or disputes over proper public goods provision.5 C (L1, L2, ..., LN)
is homogenous of degree zero so that only the relative size of groups (that is, θ1, θ2, ..., θN)
will affect output. Costs are maximized when each group maintains an identical share of the
labor force; costs decrease as the labor force share of one group approaches unity.
Suppose, however, that workers of different types also supply unique skills so that a
diverse workforce provides a greater range of perspectives, ideas, and problem-solving tech-
4See Cox, Lobel, and McLeod (1991), O’Reilly, Williams, and Barsade (1998), Florida (2002), Hong and
Page (2004), and Page (2007) for further evidence on the gains from diversity.
5See Lazear (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), Ottaviano
and Peri (2005), and Sparber (2007b).
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niques. Workers from varied groups will complement each other in production. A “love of
labor variety” term can account for these complementarities, as can a nested CES specifi-
cation that allows for imperfect substitutability across labor groups.6 Let G (L1, L2, ..., LN)
represent a homogenous of degree one function identifying potential gains. An equal labor
force share across groups will maximize production complementarities; gains are negligible
if a single group comprises nearly all of the labor force.
Equation (1) combines these cost and complementarity terms into a single produc-
tion function where output (Y ) experiences constant returns to capital (K) and labor
(L1, L2, ..., LN), augmented by an exogenous technology parameter (A). Equation (2) repre-
sents average labor productivity (output per worker, y) as a function of capital per worker
(k) and each group’s proportion of the labor force (θ1, θ2, ..., θN). An increase in diversity
refers to a mix of labor force shares that comes closer to an equal representation of each
group in production.
Y = F (K,L1, L2, ..., LN ) = A ·K
1−α · C (L1, L2, ..., LN ) ·G (L1, L2, ..., LN )
α (1)
y = A · k1−α · C (θ1, θ2, ..., θN) ·G (θ1, θ2, ..., θN)
α (2)
Clearly, if diversity causes both costs and labor complementarities to increase, one must
impose further assumptions on the nature of C (·) andG (·) to predict the theoretical effect on
net productivity. Rather than explore these theoretical implications, I advocate empirical
analysis to improve understanding. While the majority of prior work has assessed ethnic
diversity and economic performance across countries, this paper prefers analysis of racial
diversity in the United States as an alternative strategy.
First, the costs and benefits of diversity could vary across national borders. Thoughmajor
intercultural conflict or warfare is certainly a common occurrence for some countries, others
could conceivably exploit complementarities in creativity and problem solving. Collier (2000)
6Each option has historical parallels to employing a complementarity term for the variety of machines in
production. See Ethier (1982) or Romer (1987), for example.
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and Collier (2001) address this potential for cross-country variation in attitudes toward
diversity by arguing that diversity is only detrimental to non-democracies, since democracies
establish better systems to manage cultural conflict. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) prefer
instead to focus on stages of economic development. To them, diversity negatively affects
GDP per capita growth in poor countries but not in their developed counterparts. A third
alternative for avoiding the variation in attitudes toward diversity is to simply focus on a
single country (e.g., the United States) since cultural sentiments, ethnic strife, and racial
tolerance are likely to be more consistent across states or cities within a country than they
are across national boundaries. This method also has the obvious advantage of providing
insight into a specific country’s experience with diversity.7
Second, ambiguous ethnicity definitions confound analysis. Ethnicity classifies people
according to cultural, linguistic, religious, or national identities. Daniel Posner (2004) criti-
cizes the inherent “grouping problem” associated with cross-country measurement of ethnic
demography in that analysts artificially categorize people into groups that do not accurately
reflect their identity. Similarly, Fearon (2003) argues that one “must make all manner of
borderline-arbitrary decisions, and that in many cases there simply is no single right answer
to the question ‘What are the ethnic groups in this country?’” Emphasis on the U.S. experi-
ence helps reduce this problem, but individuals may still be unable to correctly identify their
own ethnicity. Race, by contrast, is more straightforward and generally classifies people ac-
cording to the continent from which their ancestors descended — European (White), African
(Black), Asian, Native American, and so on. Not only can individuals easily identify their
own race, but they can often identify the race of others as well. Caselli and Coleman (2002)
argue that conflict and reduced labor productivity arise when groups are readily recogniz-
able. On the other hand, ease of group identification also suggests that a person’s race will
affect his or her experiences. If experiences shape a person’s world view, thought processes,
7For example, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find that heterogeneity (based upon immigrants’ countries of
origin) complements production and boosts native-born wages and productivity in US cities. Similarly,
Sparber (2007a) compares racial diversity and gross state product per worker across US states.
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etc., people from varied races may have differing ideas, innovative strategies, and approaches
to problem solving. Firms wishing to employ a labor force with diverse perspectives may be
able to increase productivity by hiring a racially diverse workers.8
Finally, U.S. politicians consider many race-based initiatives, including affirmative action
policies aimed at promoting racial minorities, on a regular basis. Executives filed the afore-
mentioned amicus brief to argue for the merits of racial diversity in the United States. Not
only will an empirical exploration of the aggregate effects of increased racial diversity in the
U.S. control for variation in attitudes toward diversity and eliminate the grouping problem,
but it will provide evidence that can contribute to current U.S. policy debates as well.
3 Methodology and Data
The regressions in this paper will assess the net productivity effect of racial diversity across
state-industry cells in 1980, 1990, and 2000. The decennial Census provides pertinent data
for an individual’s race, wage, industry of employment, and various control variables, which
I aggregate to the state-industry level for each Census year. First, I must manipulate the
data to make it consistent over time since Census industry codes vary across years. Fortu-
nately, the Integrated Public Use Microdata series (IPUMS) has restored comparability by
translating current-year codes into their 1950 equivalents. For 1970-2000 data, this results in
creating approximately 150 finely-sorted industries under several broad categorical listings.
The detail in most of the 150 industry groups remains overly specific for this paper, as many
of the cells would be formed on only a few observations. Instead, I reclassify industries into
larger aggregates. In most cases, I simply employ the IPUMS categorical headings. I only
abandon the IPUMS scheme when 1950 equivalents to current year industries do not exist.
This is relevant for “Computer Manufacturing” and “Computer Software & Design,” which
8A person’s cultural background will also shape his or her experiences in a similar manner. A series of
papers by Ottaviano and Peri more thoroughly address the effects of cultural diversity. This paper does not
dismiss the importance of culture, but rather assesses whether gains are present when ethnic identities are
aggregated to the level of race.
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IPUMS lists as subcomponents of “Office and Store Machines and Devices” and “Miscella-
neous Business Services,” respectively. Specific information regarding the aggregation and
refinement of the IPUMS data is available on request. Ultimately, this paper considers the
42 industries in Table 1.
Next, I turn to an appropriate measure of labor productivity. The population Census
data does not provide a direct measure of output per worker. Instead, assume that, in the
aggregate, firms pay each factor its marginal product. Equation (2) and Euler’s theorem
clearly demonstrate that the weighted average wage paid to labor is directly proportional to
average labor productivity. That is, w =
N∑
i=1
wi·Li
N∑
i=1
Li
= α·y. The Census does provide individual
wage data, which I use to calculate average wages paid to workers for each state-industry
cell, my proxy for labor productivity.9
To construct diversity indices, one must first determine an appropriate racial classifica-
tion scheme. I classify individuals into five groups: Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Whites, and
Others.10 Note that although “Hispanic” most accurately reflects an ethnic description, half
of the Hispanic population chose “some other race” or “two or more” races on 2000 Census
forms. Moreover, 97% of Census respondents marking “some other race” in 2000 were of
Hispanic origin. These anomalies persuade the National Research Council (2004) to argue
that research on race in the U.S. should include a separate category for Hispanics despite
definitional contravention.
Though Equation (2) expresses production as a non-linear function of each racial group’s
9Wages averaged across workers of all races could manifest discrimination factors against minorities, and
thereby lead to biased estimates of the effects of diversity on society as a whole. An earlier version of this
paper adopted the average wage paid to White workers as the proxy for productivity to avoid this problem.
However, Sparber (2007b) demonstrates that it is possible for diversity to generate wage gains for Whites
while reducing aggregate labor productivity. The model in Equation (2) suggests that average wages paid
to all workers is the more appropriate proxy, so this paper adopts the measure.
10In 2000, the “Other” category represented less than 3% of the labor force. In this year only, the category
includes non-Hispanics of mixed heritage (1.6% of the labor force). Inclusion of this group does not affect
qualitative results. I perceive the emergence of this group simply as an evolution in the US understanding of
diversity, which will not affect the interpretation of the results. Thus, I include them in this paper’s analysis.
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Table 1: Racial Fractionalization and Labor Force Share of Industries, 2000.
Industry Average S.D. Industry Average S.D.
Advertising 0.217 0.130 0.42 Insurance 0.248 0.138 1.88
Agriculture 0.300 0.175 2.24 Legal Services 0.183 0.116 1.13
Aircraft & Parts 0.243 0.148 0.51 Mining 0.169 0.150 0.39
Apparel Retail 0.355 0.176 0.64 Motor Vehicles & Engines 0.339 0.168 1.24
Bars & Restaurants 0.401 0.161 5.24 Other Business Services 0.339 0.146 4.96
Colleges & Universities 0.331 0.126 2.11 Other Durables 0.332 0.162 1.60
Computer & Software Design 0.285 0.123 1.16 Other Machinery 0.270 0.159 1.42
Computer Manufacturing 0.346 0.181 0.33 Other Non-Durables 0.381 0.169 0.89
Construction 0.274 0.156 7.00 Other Professional Services 0.314 0.148 2.77
Drugs & Chemicals 0.320 0.150 0.81 Other Retail 0.245 0.145 6.02
Education, Non-College 0.280 0.152 7.68 Paper Products 0.276 0.145 1.82
Electrical Machinery 0.354 0.152 1.39 Personal Services 0.369 0.191 1.76
Engineering & Architecture 0.188 0.121 0.93 Public Administration 0.328 0.155 5.33
Entertainment & Recreation 0.323 0.145 1.97 Raw Durables 0.313 0.176 1.40
Fabricated Metals 0.322 0.156 1.41 Real Estate 0.251 0.135 1.60
Finance 0.279 0.148 3.13 Repair Shops 0.282 0.161 1.71
Food & Beverage Manuf 0.445 0.172 1.17 Telecommunications 0.332 0.158 1.03
Food, Drug, & Alcohol Retail 0.313 0.165 3.09 Textiles 0.405 0.183 0.95
General Retail 0.342 0.169 2.34 Transportation 0.319 0.176 3.83
Health Services 0.328 0.166 8.92 Utilities 0.274 0.152 1.17
Hotels 0.442 0.181 1.06 Wholesale Trade 0.271 0.155 3.54
Racial Diversity Racial Diversity% of Labor 
Force
% of Labor 
Force
labor force share, I prefer instead to employ a single aggregate measure of diversity in the
empirical analysis. Ideally, such an index would provide a description of the relative size
and variety of racial backgrounds present in a society. The most common measure — racial
fractionalization (RF ) — ranges from zero to one and represents the probability that two
people in the labor force, drawn at random, will be of different racial groups.11 High RF
implies the existence of many groups and/or a large minority share of the labor force, and
hence captures the variety and size of racial groups in a given industry within a state.12 For
11Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), Alesina et al. (2003), and Ot-
taviano and Peri (2006) employ fractionalization indices. For comparison, Alesina et al. (2003) also uses
an index of polarization as a proxy for diversity. (See Lian and Oneal (1997) and Fearon (2003) for more
comment). Polarization indices further distinguish whether an observation has high diversity due to the
existence of a few equally-represented groups, or instead is characterized by the existence of one large group
and several small minority groups. Thus, differences between polarization and fractionalization become more
pronounced when the number of groups used in the construction of the indices varies widely across obser-
vations. Since fractionalization indices are more common in economics, more easily interpretable, and less
subject to criticism when each observation has roughly the same number of racial groups, I use it as my sole
measure of diversity.
12Since this paper is concerned with long-run aggregate output per worker, I base diversity indices on the
labor force. These figures are similar to those based upon employed workers since unemployed individuals
must continue to self-identify with a particular industry to be included in the labor force dataset.
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a state-industry cell “s, i,”
RFs,i = 1−
R∑
r=1
(Labor Force Sharer,s,i)
2
, (3)
or, RFs,i = 1−
R∑
r=1
(
LFr,s,i
Ts,i
)2
where LFr,s,i = Labor force participants of race r in state s and industry i.
r = {Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Whites, Others}.
and Ts,i = Total labor force in state s and industry i.
I calculate RF indices across the 48 contiguous states and 42 industries (for 48*42=2016
state-industry cells) in 1980, 1990, and 2000.13 The 2000 Louisiana computer manufacturing
industry is the most diverse, with RF=0.729. Several state-industry cells were completely
homogeneous. The unweighted mean and standard deviation of racial fractionalization over
the period are 0.251 and 0.161, respectively. The weighted mean and standard deviation
equal 0.341 and 0.164.
4 Industry-Specific Effects of Diversity
Weighted Least Squares Regression
Most analyses of diversity and productivity assume the effects of diversity are equal across
industries. However, if the importance of problem solving, product development, innovation,
marketing, and customer service varies across industries, the effects of diversity may vary as
well. Thus, sectoral analysis may be more informative than traditional aggregate regressions.
The regression specification in Equation (4) will identify industry-specific diversity co-
efficients by employing a decennial panel dataset covering 1980 to 2000 with state-industry
cells representing the unit of observation. Since small state-industry cells may be associated
13Although data from 1970 is available, I use it to construct instrumental variables later in the analysis.
The methodology necessitates omission of 1970 data from the empirical model.
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with more error, and these cells should not be allowed to drive results, regressions will weight
observations by the weighted sum of Census respondents within each cell.14
ln(Wages,i,t) = αs,i +
42∑
i=1
βi ∗RFs,i,t + γ1 ∗ Eds,i,t + γ2 ∗ EdFracs,i,t (4)
+
2000∑
t=1990
δt ∗Decades,i,t + ǫs,i,t
Where s = 48 contiguous states, i = 42 industries, t = 3 decades.
Wage = Average wage earnings of individuals.
αs,i = Unobserved state*industry fixed effects.
RF = Racial fractionalization (diversity variable).
Ed = Average years of schooling.
EdFrac = Educational fractionalization.
Decade = Decade indicator variables for 1990 and 2000.
The model is parsimonious, and includes only a few controls. First, education is a clear
determinant of aggregate wages, so productivity regressions must control for it accordingly.
Furthermore, since educational attainment is correlated with race, racial diversity and edu-
cational diversity will be correlated as well. Failure to control for educational diversity might
generate spurious correlation between wages and racial diversity. Thus, I include an educa-
tional fractionalization variable (EdFrac) to measure the probability that two people, drawn
at random, will be of different educational groups.15 Regressions will also account for wage
trends over time by including decade indicator variables, and they exploit the advantages
14The typical observation contains aggregate data representing approximately 2900 Census respondents.
However, the number of respondents within a cell is highly skewed to the right. More than 400 cells are
based upon fewer than 100 respondents, while 86 represent more than 20,000 respondents.
15The educational groups include people that have dropped out of school, those that have a high school
degree, individuals with some college experience, and a final group of workers who have obtained a bachelors
degree or more schooling. Alternative results for regressions allowing EdFrac to enter as a quadratic and/or
cubic term, as well as those permitting industry-specific values, are available upon request. These variants
have little effect on the qualitative racial diversity results. Columns 7 & 8 of Table 5 also display results for
specifications with more comprehensive EdFrac controls.
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of the panel dataset by including fixed-effects for state-industry cells over the three decade
panel to control for the existence of unobserved time invariant factors specific to states and
industries.16
The weighted least square results reported in Table 2 cluster on state-industry cells
to control for time correlation in standard error calculations. The regression produces 42
industry-specific coefficients, which the table lists in descending order of magnitude, condi-
tional upon being significant at the 10% confidence level. Diversity is positively related to
productivity for 26 industries, and negatively related for seven sectors. Positive correlations
mark the Legal, Health, and Finance industries — services in which the ability to commu-
nicate well with clients is especially important. At the same time, diversity is negatively
associated with wages in the more traditional sectors of the economy such as Raw Durables,
Fabricated Metals, and Transportation.
Though these results are informative about the industries that might experience gains
or losses from diversity, they fail to establish causality. Moreover, omitted variables may
be generating spurious correlations. Therefore, more careful analysis of endogeneity and
omitted variables is required before fully addressing the magnitude and interpretation of
diversity coefficients.
Endogeneity and Omitted Variables
The large number of positive coefficients in Table 2 may indicate that diversity augments
productivity, or instead they could demonstrate that productive states and industries simply
attract a diverse labor force. To establish the direction of causation, I develop instrumen-
tal variables according to a three-step shift-share methodology similar to Card (2001) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
In the first step, I begin by recording the labor force demography of the United States in
16Suppose that discrimination exists so that minorities earn only a fraction (λ) of their marginal product
of labor. Then simple algebra can illustrate that estimation of (4) will disproportionally weight the effects
of diversity on the productivity of the majority group, which may be positive or negative.
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Table 2: Industry-Specific Marginal Effects of Diversity.
Instrumental Variables No
Time Fixed Effects d
Panel Fixed Effects s*i
Unit of Observation s*i*d cells
Legal Services 2.704 Telecommunications 0.198
(0.207)*** (0.078)**
Finance 2.102 Education, Non-College 0.237
(0.230)*** (0.184)
Hotels 1.688 Mining 0.218
(0.190)*** (0.249)
Health Services 1.685 Utilities 0.128
(0.269)*** (0.154)
Agriculture 1.267 Food & Beverage Manuf 0.125
(0.179)*** (0.090)
Other Business Services 1.125 Other Machinery 0.079
(0.094)*** (0.120)
Electrical Machinery 1.019 Food, Drug, & Alc Retail 0.063
(0.250)*** (0.083)
Bars & Restaurants 0.983 Aircraft & Parts 0.031
(0.086)*** (0.133)
Textiles 0.902 Construction -0.059
(0.171)*** (0.111)
Insurance 0.893 Colleges & Universities -0.197
(0.153)*** (0.139)
Other Durables 0.842 Other Professional Srvcs -0.210
(0.136)*** (0.126)*
Entertainment & Recreation 0.809 Public Administration -0.345
(0.071)*** (0.201)*
Real Estate 0.755 Fabricated Metals -0.370
(0.160)*** (0.220)*
Comp & Software Design 0.662 Raw Durables -0.389
(0.142)*** (0.217)*
Advertising 0.634 Motor Vehicles & Engines -0.396
(0.119)*** (0.192)**
Other Retail 0.611 Other Non-Durables -0.511
(0.074)*** (0.094)***
Repair Shops 0.587 Transportation -1.168
(0.085)*** (0.140)***
Personal Services 0.584 Years of Schooling 0.141
(0.145)*** (0.011)***
Computer Manufacturing 0.562 Education Fractionalization -0.886
(0.208)*** (0.117)***
Engineering & Architecture 0.455 Observations 6048
(0.120)*** R-Squared 0.91
General Retail 0.426
(0.114)*** Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Drugs & Chemicals 0.354 Fixed Effects: d = decade, s = state, 
(0.129)***      i = industry.
Paper Products 0.310 *** Coefficient significant at 1%
(0.141)** ** Coefficient significant at 5%
Wholesale Trade 0.300 * Coefficient significant at 10%
(0.075)*** Constant suppressed.
Apparel Retail 0.272
(0.093)***
Dependent Variable: ln(Average Wage)
1970. That is, I count the number of labor force participants by race for each state-industry
cell of that year. Traditional shift-share instruments simply assume past economic success
did not influence the demographic composition of cells in the base year. Indeed, the U.S.
map in Figure 1 suggests that this may be true. States with racial fractionalization indices
greater than 0.35 are shaded black. Those with RF indices between 0.30 and 0.35 are gray.
It appears that two factors determine a state’s racial diversity in 1970 — the historical reality
of slavery in the U.S. South, and immigration trends bringing large Hispanic populations to
the Southwest.
Rather than assume that the 1970 demography is exogenous, I compute the number
of Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, and Other workers in each cell that are predicted by
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Figure 1: Racial Fractionalization in 1970. States with racial fractionalization indices above
0.35 are shaded black. Those between 0.30 and 0.35 are shaded gray.
exogenous geographic forces. First, I calculate the natural log of one plus the number of
workers in each cell, by racial group, in 1970. Then I regress this figure on indicator variables
for former Confederate states, Mexican border states, and Pacific Coast states. I also include
the natural log of the labor force to control for cell size. The results of these regressions are
in the Appendix. The coefficients of these exogenous features then predict the number of
workers, by race, that comprised state-industry cells in 1970.
The second step in this modified shift-share methodology requires calculation of the
national labor force growth rate of each racial group from 1970 to 1980, 1970 to 1990, and
1970 to 2000. I then multiply these national growth rates by the exogenous 1970 state-
industry demography constructed in the first step in order to predict state-industry racial
composition in subsequent decades.
In the final step, I use the predicted demography to calculate new RF indices, which
I employ as instruments for observed values. Altogether, this methodology describes what
the U.S. would look like if geography and cell-size determined the 1970 racial composition
14
of state-industry cells, and these populations subsequently grew at their national rates.17
Column 1 of Table 3 revisits the regression of the previous subsection. I maintain the
assumption that unobserved time invariant factors specific to state-industry cells exist, and
continue to control for time trends, education, and educational diversity. Now, however, I
adopt a two stage weighted least squares approach, employing predicted racial fractionaliza-
tion (RFIV ) values as instruments for their observed counterparts (RF ).18 As before, the
coefficients are listed in descending order of magnitude, conditional upon being significant
at the 10% confidence level.
The instrumental variable results provide causal evidence for the associations uncovered
in the previous section. A one standard deviation increase of racial fractionalization (0.161) in
the Legal, Finance, or Health industries — roughly the same increase in diversity experienced
by moving from Michigan to Arizona, or from South Dakota to Tennessee19 — would generate
more than a 30% increase in wages. The large coefficient on Advertising (0.661) indicates
that a similar shock would increase wages by 10.6%, thus providing evidence that a diverse
workforce improves marketing capabilities. High-tech firms also benefit greatly, as the results
for computer manufacturing and software demonstrate. In sum, the results lend credence —
at least superficially — to the argument that diversity facilitates the creation of new products,
aids marketing, and improves customer service.
While we have evidence that 15 industries experience gains from diversity, four traditional
sectors (Fabricated Metals, Non-Durables, Raw Durables, and Transportation) see declines.
Lack of product differentiation minimizes the necessity of diverse customer service and mar-
keting skills, while creative decision making and innovation are not likely to be vital within
these industries. Positive coefficients should not be expected. That the marginal effects are
17The standard shift-share methodology requires base-year data to generate instruments for subsequent
years. Since no instruments exist for the base year, observations from that year must be dropped in all two
stage least squares regressions. I therefore choose to omit 1970 data from all specifications.
18Eighteen state-industry cells did not exist in 1970. Instrumental variables are not available for these
cells in subsequent years, thus reducing the total number of observations in each regression by 54.
19This approximation is based upon the state-level racial diversity of the labor force in 2000. Michigan
(RF = 0.316) and Tennessee (0.313) were the median states. Arizona (0.476) was the tenth most diverse
state, while South Dakota (0.152) was the seventh least diverse.
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Table 3: Industry-Specific Marginal Effects of Diversity.
1 2 1 2
Dependent Variable
ln(Average 
Wage) ln(Wage)
Instrumental Variables Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects d d*s, d*i
Panel Fixed Effects s*i s*i*o
Unit of Observation s*i*d cells Individuals
Legal Services 2.593 2.647 Paper Products 0.016 1.286
(0.474)*** (0.437)*** (0.486) (0.656)*
Finance 2.246 1.709 Food, Drug, & Alc Retail -0.081 -0.155
(0.342)*** (0.342)*** (0.314) (0.495)
Health Services 2.045 2.467 Education, Non-College -0.101 1.749
(0.636)*** (0.322)*** (0.672) (0.697)**
Hotels 1.976 1.410 Other Professional Srvcs -0.252 1.256
(0.443)*** (0.647)** (0.400) (0.235)***
Electrical Machinery 1.314 1.776 Colleges & Universities -0.462 0.364
(0.483)*** (0.477)*** (0.346) (0.549)
Other Business Services 1.121 1.024 Construction -0.564 -0.018
(0.263)*** (0.157)*** (0.473) (0.619)
Computer Manufacturing 1.011 1.573 Public Administration -0.709 1.329
(0.238)*** (0.635)** (0.507) (0.241)***
Insurance 0.925 1.381 Other Machinery -0.757 0.239
(0.366)** (0.247)*** (0.716) (1.218)
Bars & Restaurants 0.869 0.591 Motor Vehicles & Engines -1.280 0.813
(0.347)** (0.622) (0.927) (2.100)
Other Durables 0.845 1.390 Mining -1.904 -1.050
(0.464)* (0.751)* (1.470) (1.731)
Comp & Software Design 0.794 1.707 Other Non-Durables -0.810 -0.315
(0.210)*** (1.059) (0.359)** (0.392)
Entertainment & Recreation 0.749 0.816 Raw Durables -1.170 -0.017
(0.262)*** (0.197)*** (0.669)* (1.417)
Advertising 0.661 0.882 Transportation -1.566 -0.510
(0.256)*** (0.348)** (0.375)*** (0.396)
Real Estate 0.646 1.323 Fabricated Metals -2.517 -0.731
(0.312)** (0.197)*** (1.201)** (2.182)
Other Retail 0.490 0.599 Years of Schooling 0.119 0.058
(0.292)* (0.409) (0.021)*** (0.001)***
Agriculture 2.394 4.662 Education Fractionalization -0.882 -0.549
(1.621) (6.151) (0.237)*** (1.102)
Textiles 1.774 1.091 Age 0.011
(1.421) (9.144) (0.000)***
Personal Services 0.574 2.770 Reside in Metroarea Indicator 0.113
(0.528) (1.461)* (0.002)***
Drugs & Chemicals 0.459 1.587 Female Indicator -0.334
(0.332) (0.295)*** (0.003)***
Repair Shops 0.429 0.336 Foreign-Born Indicator 0.032
(0.374) (0.568) (0.005)***
General Retail 0.358 0.248 Asian Indicator -0.064
(0.329) (0.489) (0.007)***
Engineering & Architecture 0.310 1.164 Black  Indicator -0.045
(0.389) (0.553)** (0.004)***
Telecommunications 0.199 0.617 Hispanic Indicator -0.023
(0.267) (0.616) (0.005)***
Apparel Retail 0.189 0.173 Other Minority Race Indicator -0.047
(0.234) (0.342) (0.007)***
Wholesale Trade 0.124 0.587 Observations 5994 1514920
(0.339) (0.462) R-Squared 0.90 0.13
Food & Beverage Manuf 0.096 0.505
(0.437) (1.156) Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Utilities 0.077 1.496 Fixed Effects: d = decade, s = state, i = industry, o = occupation.
(0.554) (0.687)** *** Coefficient significant at 1%
Aircraft & Parts 0.059 1.411 ** Coefficient significant at 5%
(0.310) (0.311)*** * Coefficient significant at 10%
Constant suppressed.
negative, however, indicates that diversity causes a diversion from productive activity. This
outcome resembles the costs envisioned by the international literature.
While the signs on the productivity effects of diversity are intuitively appealing, the
magnitudes are uncomfortably large. Individual-level analysis provides an alternative esti-
mation strategy that may prove to be more informative, although such specifications are less
consistent with theoretical models of diversity and productivity.
First, it may be that baseline regressions exhibit large omitted variables bias. Individual-
level regressions can control for an increased number of factors without overwhelming the
data. Second, by accounting for individual-level heterogeneity, regressions should be able to
ascertain whether diversity directly complements production or instead simply attracts the
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most talented workers. Assume that individuals who are identical in their race, sex, age,
occupation, native citizenship, choice to live in an urban environment, state of residence,
and industry of employment also have homogeneous talents. By using individual-level re-
gressions accounting for these talents, positive diversity coefficients will indicate that com-
plementarities between races exist, and that productivity gains are not due to self-selection
of talented individuals into diverse state-industry cells. Third, individual-level regressions
permit a richer set of fixed effects. Expanded time-invariant fixed effects for state-industry-
occupation indicators can provide a more rigorous control for individual unobservables. More
importantly, the increased number of observations associated with individual-level regressions
allow decade*state and decade*industry terms to control for state-specific or industry-specific
time trends.
The second column of Table 3 presents a regression of the natural log of an individual’s
annualized wage on the aforementioned controls and the diversity of the state-industry cell
in which he/she works. First, I sample 10% of the labor force that earned a wage in the year
of observation, dropping all individuals working in state-industry cells in which instruments
are unavailable. I then convert wages to reflect a person’s yearly wage earnings, assuming a
52-week work year. That is, Wage = Annual Wage Earnings ·
(
52
Weeks Worked
)
. Schooling
and age variables should control for variation in an individual’s skills, while gender, race, and
foreign-born indicators will reveal a combination of discrimination and ability gaps across
groups in the U.S.20
This alternative methodology does little to alter qualitative results. Racial diversity
generates productivity gains for half of the industries. The largest effects continue to occur
in sectors employing creative decision makers. A one standard deviation increase in diversity
causes wages to rise by more than 40% within Legal Services and Health services, while
the same increase in diversity would lead to wage gains in excess of 25% for Computer
Manufacturing and Finance. Unlike aggregate-level specifications, however, individual-level
20See Neal and Johnson (1996), Neumark (1998), Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), and Hellerstein
and Neumark (2004) for extensive analysis of discrimination and ability gaps across racial groups.
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results fail to identify any industry that experiences significant losses from diversity.
5 Industry Characteristics and the Effects of Diversity
The results of the previous section, prior academic research, and the anecdotes expressed in
the amicus brief provide guidance for better understanding of the characteristics of industries
that might complement or hinder a diverse workforce. A priori, past evidence suggests that
diversity may increase productivity in sectors that require creative decision-making, problem
solving, and customer service, but decrease it in industries requiring common action or group
effort. The difficulty in assessing these possibilities is one of measurement.
The U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET database has become an invaluable source of
information about occupational characteristics that economists can use to analyze work-
force issues. O*NET administers surveys to occupational analysts, experts, and incumbents
that ask hundreds of questions about workforce characteristics, knowledge, and activities.
Four questions are appropriate for this study. First, O*NET’s Work Activities survey asks,
“How important is making decisions and solving problems to the performance of your cur-
rent job?” and “How important is thinking creatively to the performance of your current
job?” These questions seem broadly consistent with notions of creative decision-making.
Similarly, O*NET’s Knowledge survey question “How important is customer and personal
service knowledge to the performance of your current job?” is a reasonable proxy for cus-
tomer service intensity. For a measure of common effort, I turn to Work Context survey
question, “How important are interactions that require you to work with or contribute to a
work group or team to perform your current job?”
O*NET records the average response to each of these questions, on a scale of one to
five, for more than 800 occupations that roughly correspond to the 2000 Census occupation
classification codes. I rescale the data into percentile values so that the median worker
earned a value of 0.5 for each of these categories in 2000.21 Table 10 in the Appendix
21Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Peri and Sparber (2007) perform a similar rescaling for O*NET’s
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provides examples of occupations receiving the highest, median, and lowest scores in 2000.
Though Census occupation codes vary across years, the IPUMS variable occ1950 facili-
tates comparability over time. I assign each occ1950 occupation an O*NET percentile value
based upon the a weighted average of the year 2000 occupation scores that comprise these
categories. I then use these values to construct industry-specific average O*NET values
for each year. Industries employing many workers involved in decision-making, creative-
thinking, customer service, or group-effort intensive occupations earn high scores for the
respective variables. Table 4 provides (unweighted) summary statistics, and Table 11 in the
Appendix lists the industry-specific values for 2000.
Table 4: Summary of Industry Characteristic Data, 1980-2000.
Importance of: Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
Making Decisions and 
Solving Problems   
0.499 0.094
0.252                       
(1980 Hotels)
0.765                  
(2000 Computer & 
Software Design)
Thinking Creatively   0.503 0.103
0.288                    
(1980 Bars & 
Restaurants)
0.782                 
(2000 Computer & 
Software Design)
Customer and Personal 
Service    
0.433 0.129
0.213                      
(1980 Textiles)
0.695                      
(2000 Health 
Services)
Work With Work Group 
or Team 
0.440 0.083
0.143                    
(1980 Education, 
Non-College)
0.631                     
(1990 Engineering 
& Architecture)
Rather than estimate the industry-specific marginal effects of diversity, the regressions in
Table 5 analyze the relationship between industry characteristics and the effects of diversity.22
Columns 1 and 2 are analogous to the results in Table 2, and present WLS results with state-
industry cells representing the unit of observation. Columns 3 and 4 adopt the same unit of
observation, but instead perform two-stageWLS regressions. Columns 5 and 6 use individual-
level regressions similar to those of Column 2 in Table 3. The final two columns repeat the
individual-level specifications, but also allow the effects of educational fractionalization to
vary across industries. (The output suppresses these 42 industry-specific coefficients).
Though the magnitudes of the coefficients vary across specifications, the qualitative re-
predecessor, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
22Note that while diversity continues to be measured for state*industry cells across time, the O*NET
variables only vary across industries and time.
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Table 5: Industry Characteristics and the Marginal Effects of Diversity.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Instrumental Variables
Time Fixed Effects
Panel Fixed Effects
Unit of Observation
Racial Fractionalization -1.254 -0.823 -1.181 -0.616 -0.750 -0.641 0.554 0.277
(0.212)*** (0.296)*** (0.696)* (0.712) (0.374)** (0.345)* (0.685) (0.504)
RF * Making Decisions 2.434 2.600 3.227 2.669
(0.421)*** (0.555)*** (0.454)*** (0.703)***
RF * Thinking Creatively 1.404 1.291 2.002 2.283
(0.384)*** (0.501)** (0.341)*** (0.385)***
RF * Customer Service 3.038 2.681 3.723 3.133 3.428 2.841 1.856 1.764
(0.313)*** (0.318)*** (0.500)*** (0.509)*** (0.414)*** (0.399)*** (0.649)*** (0.539)***
RF * Work with Group -1.688 -1.129 -2.236 -1.236 -3.397 -1.903 -4.099 -3.258
(0.551)*** (0.403)*** (0.577)*** (0.517)** (0.492)*** (0.427)*** (0.545)*** (0.569)***
Years of Schooling 0.148 0.165 0.160 0.181 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
(0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Education Fractionalization -0.618 -0.851 -0.640 -0.907 -0.524 -0.738
(0.109)*** (0.108)*** (0.140)*** (0.129)*** (0.096)*** (0.075)***
Age 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Reside in Metroarea Indicator 0.113 0.113 0.114 0.114
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Female Indicator -0.334 -0.334 -0.334 -0.334
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Foreign-Born Indicator 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Asian Indicator -0.063 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Black  Indicator -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.044
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Hispanic Indicator -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Other Minority Race Indicator -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 -0.046
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Observations 6048 6048 5994 5994 1514920 1514920 1514920 1514920
R-Squared 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Fixed Effects: d = decade, s = state, i = industry, o = occupation.
*** Coefficient significant at 1%
** Coefficient significant at 5%
* Coefficient significant at 10%
Columns 7 and 8 allow for 42 industry-specific coefficients on Education Fractionalization, which have been suppressed for brevity.
Constant suppressed.
d*s, d*i
s*i*o
Individuals
[Industry-Specific]
ln(Wage)
Yes
ln(Average Wage) ln(Average Wage) ln(Wage)
No Yes Yes
d d d*s, d*i
s*i s*i s*i*o
s*i*d cells s*i*d cells Individuals
sults are remarkably robust to the different methodologies. Creative decision-making and
customer service complement diversity, but diversity conflicts with group effort. Thus, the
results reconcile competing literatures by recognizing both the costs and benefits of diversity.
Table 6: Average Effects of a One Standard Deviation Increase in Diversity.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Instrumental Variables
Time Fixed Effects
Panel Fixed Effects
Unit of Observation
Effect Assuming 
Average Industry 
Characteristics
0.086 0.088 0.120 0.136 0.137 0.122 0.143 0.122
Making Decisions 0.037 0.039 0.049 0.040
Thinking Creatively 0.023 0.021 0.033 0.038
Customer Service 0.063 0.056 0.077 0.065 0.071 0.059 0.039 0.037
Work with Group -0.023 -0.015 -0.030 -0.017 -0.045 -0.025 -0.055 -0.044
Observations 6048 6048 5994 5994 1514920 1514920 1514920 1514920
R-Squared 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Additional Effect of a One Standard Deviation Increase in Given Industry Characteristics
ln(Average Wage) ln(Average Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
s*i*d cells s*i*d cells Individuals Individuals
s*i s*i s*i*o s*i*o
Yes Yes
d d d*s, d*i d*s, d*i
Estimated Effect of a One Standard Deviation (0.161) Increase in Racial Diversity
No Yes
Table 6 provides more intuitive interpretation for the size of the effects estimated in
Table 5. The first row indicates that a one standard deviation increase in racial diversity
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(0.161) would increase wages by roughly 9% to 14% for an industry characterized by average
decision-making, creativity, customer service, and team work intensity. The next four rows
demonstrate the additional effect of a one standard deviation increase in a particular industry
characteristic for the same diversity shock. For example, a one standard deviation (0.094)
increase in the importance of making decisions and solving problems — the difference between
Other Machinery (the median industry) and Health Services in 200023 — would facilitate an
additional 4% wage gain from the diversity shock. If instead creative decision-making is
measured by the importance of thinking creatively, a one standard deviation (0.103) rise
would cause the diversity shock to generate an additional 2-3% wage increase. Results for
customer service are larger. The effects of the diversity shock improve 6-7% for a 0.129 rise
in service importance — the difference between Education and Personal Services — though
the estimates are smaller if the coefficient on educational diversity is allowed to vary across
industries. In contrast to these results, however, group effort conflicts with diversity and
serves to reduce productivity. The magnitude of these losses is comparable to the gains
generated by complements between diversity and creative thinking.24
6 Robustness — Labor Supply and Demand
Equation (2) and diminishing marginal returns to labor imply that reduced labor supply
will cause wages to rise. This paper has implicitly assumed that labor supply is fixed.
However, many analysts recognize the possibility that diversity could alter labor supply if
White workers respond to diversity by leaving the labor force, though empirics usually fail
to uncover evidence that such an effect truly exists.25 To ensure wage effects from aggregate
regressions do not solely reflect supply changes, I now consider estimation of labor supply as a
23For further examples of industries separated by one standard deviation in a given skill, see the values in
Table 11 of the Appendix.
24A previous version of this paper (available upon request) measured creative-decision making, customer
service, and common action intensity with the share of workers with a college degree, working in customer
service, and belonging to a union, respectively. In that version, diversity complemented creativity and
conflicted with unionization.
25See Becker (1971), Marsden (1988), and Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
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share of the total labor force in the U.S. according to Equation (5). Except for the dependent
variable, the labor force specification is identical to the wage regression in Equation (4).
100 ∗ LFs,i,t
48∑
s=1
42∑
i=1
LFs,i,t
= αls,i +
42∑
i=1
βli ∗RFs,i,t + γ
l
1
∗ Eds,i,t + γ
l
2
∗ EdFracs,i,t (5)
+
2000∑
t=1990
δlt ∗Decades,i,t + ǫ
l
s,i,t
Where s = 48 contiguous states, i = 42 industries, t = 3 decades.
Wage = Average wage earnings of individuals.
LF = Labor force.
αls,i = Unobserved fixed effects correlated with the regressors.
RF = Racial fractionalization (diversity variable).
Ed = Average years of schooling.
EdFrac = Educational fractionalization.
Decade = Decade indicator variables for 1990 and 2000.
If diversity bolsters productivity, the labor demand curve will shift out, increasing both
the equilibrium quantity of labor supplied and wages. If utility also depends upon diversity,
however, the labor supply curve will shift as well. Empirically, the change in wages and
labor force captures the net effect of these shifts, making it impossible to ascertain the
magnitude of productivity gains or losses. By estimating both the regression in (4) and (5)
with instruments outlined in Section 4, however, I may be able to identify the sign of the
productivity shift for some industries. Assuming that labor demand is not perfectly inelastic,
we can be sure that diversity increases productivity if the sign on racial fractionalization in
either the wage or labor supply regression is positive and the sign in the other is non-negative.
The converse is also true — if the sign in one regression is negative and the other is non-
positive, diversity causes productivity to decrease. Ambiguity exists only when diversity has
22
opposite effects on wages and the size of the labor force. In these cases, the productivity
consequences could be positive, negative, or nonexistent.
Table 7 displays the marginal effects of racial diversity for only those industries in which
productivity consequences can be ascertained. Racial diversity increases productivity in at
least 14 industries. These continue to be the sectors in which creative decision-making plays
a dominant role. Seven industries continue to exhibit adverse consequences. As in prior
specifications, losses occur in the traditional sectors of the economy — Fabricated Metals,
Raw Durables Manufacturing, and Mining, for example. Creative decision making may not
play an important role within these industries, and instead conflict, rent-seeking behavior,
and costs of common action dominate.
Table 7: Industry-Specific Marginal Effects of Diversity — Industries in which Diversity
Positively or Negatively Affects Productivity.
IV Yes Yes
Decade Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State*Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Wage LF Shr Wage LF Shr
Advertising 0.661 -0.256 Aircraft & Parts 0.059 -0.867
(0.256)*** (0.292) (0.310) (0.377)**
Bars & Restaurants 0.869 -0.226 Fabricated Metals -2.517 -2.823
(0.347)** (0.379) (1.201)** (1.331)**
Comp & Software Design 0.794 0.239 Other Machinery -0.757 -1.649
(0.210)*** (0.246) (0.716) (0.771)**
Computer Manufacturing 1.011 -0.257 Other Non-Durables -0.810 -0.351
(0.238)*** (0.202) (0.359)** (0.398)
Entertainment & Rec Srvc 0.749 -0.111 Paper Products 0.016 -0.949
(0.262)*** (0.318) (0.486) (0.534)*
Finance 2.246 -0.184 Raw Durables -1.170 -1.085
(0.342)*** (0.309) (0.669)* (0.763)
Health Services 2.045 0.064 Transportation -1.566 -0.307
(0.636)*** (0.504) (0.375)*** (0.337)
Hotels 1.976 -0.379
(0.443)*** (0.400)
Insurance 0.925 -0.486 Years of Schooling 0.119 -0.040
(0.366)** (0.396) (0.021)*** (0.023)*
Legal Services 2.593 -0.306 Education Fractionalization -0.882 0.048
(0.474)*** (0.376) (0.237)*** (0.212)
Other Business Services 1.121 0.528 Observations 5994 5994
(0.263)*** (0.471)
Other Durables 0.845 -0.515 Panel covers 48 contiguous US states and 42 industries 
(0.464)* (0.502)         in 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Other Retail 0.490 -0.108 Unit of observation: state-industry cells.
(0.292)* (0.346) Diversity measured as racial fractionalization (RF).
Real Estate 0.646 -0.376 Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
(0.312)** (0.315) *** Coefficient significant at 1%
** Coefficient significant at 5%
* Coefficient significant at 10%
Constant and  indicator variables suppressed.
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Industry-Specific Marginal Effects of Diversity
Dependent Variables: 
ln(Average Wage)
100*(LFs,i,t)/(Total LFt)
7 Conclusions
The amicus brief filed by thirty Fortune 500 companies endorsing the University of Michi-
gan’s affirmative action admissions policies claims that a diverse workforce bolsters creative
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decision making, product development, customer service, and marketing. Many social sci-
entists concur with these beliefs, yet international growth economists remain skeptical and
argue that diversity exacerbates rent-seeking activity and the costs of common action. This
paper maintains that unqualified statements regarding the costs and merits of diversity are
inappropriate for the U.S. economy, as racial heterogeneity increases productivity in many,
but not all, industries.
Two-stage weighted least squares regressions at the aggregate-level imply that a one
standard deviation increase in diversity would raise wages by 42% in Legal Services, 16%
in Computer Manufacturing, 13% in Computer Software, and 11% in Advertising. Though
large, individual-level regressions controlling for selection bias, state and industry specific
time trends, and individual characteristics reinforce baseline results. The gains from diver-
sity are sizeable and economically relevant. Losses envisioned by the international growth
literature occur in only seven industries and are concentrated in traditional sectors of the
economy including Mining, Raw Durables, Fabricated Metals, and Transportation.
O*NET data on occupational characteristics identifies the features that determine whether
industries benefit or suffer from diversity. Regressions show that diversity bolsters productiv-
ity and wages in industries employing many creative decision makers. This is true whether
regressions employ the O*NET variable measuring the necessity of making decisions and
solving problems, or instead uses a variable that accounts for the importance of thinking
creatively. These regressions also show that diversity complements customer service. Het-
erogeneity reduces productivity in sectors requiring high levels of group effort and common
action, however, just as the international literature would predict.
This paper creates numerous possibilities for continued research across several economic
fields. Most importantly, aggregate data cannot describe the level of diversity existing in
a person’s workplace. Instead, behavioral economists should assess how diversity changes
group behavior, and how these changes could influence economic outcomes. Similarly, micro-
economists could employ plant-level data to analyze how diversity affects the productivity
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of firms.
International economists will ask whether these results are unique to the United States,
or if they may be applicable to other countries as well. Recent events in France and Australia
suggest that even developed democracies have difficulties managing diversity, but empirics
are required to measure the net effects. If the U.S. is different, why is this the case? What
institutions are in place to help the United States reap the benefits of diversity? Are mer-
itocratic norms and rewards to innovation and creativity better established in the U.S., or
are other factors more essential?
Diversity complements creativity in generating productivity gains, so policy makers may
want to increase the level of diversity in creativity-intensive sectors. This paper does not,
however, take a stance on the efficacy of affirmative action or various immigration policies
in achieving this goal. Public economists certainly have great interest in such issues.
Contrasting literatures exist highlighting the costs and benefits of racial diversity. This
paper reconciles these views by illustrating that diversity generates both gains and losses for
the United States. Racial heterogeneity bolsters creative decision making and customer ser-
vice, but exacerbates losses associated with common action. I encourage further exploration
of these issues and their effect on the U.S. and world economy.
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A Appendix
Exogeneity of Instruments
For the instruments in the analysis to be valid, 1970 state-industry demography must be
exogenous. To ensure this, I estimate the number of individuals, by race, who would have
been working in each cell if 1970 demography had solely been determined by geographic
features and the overall size of the cells. To guarantee that predictions will be positive, the
dependent variable equals the natural log of one plus the number of people of a given race.
The geographic explanatory variables include an indicator for former Confederate states
(to account for large Black populations), Mexican border states (to account for Hispanic
populations), and Pacific Coast states (to account for Asian populations). Table 8 displays
the coefficients, which are then used to predict exogenous demography in 1970, the necessary
first step in the creation of the shift-share instruments described in the text.
Table 8: Determinants of Racial Demography in 1970.
Asians Blacks Hispanics Whites Others
Border 0.724 -0.119 2.901 -0.163 1.713
(0.171)*** (0.164) (0.164)*** (0.016)*** (0.175)***
Former Confederate State -0.956 2.145 -0.055 -0.103 -1.089
(0.106)*** (0.101)*** (0.101) (0.010)*** (0.109)***
West Coast 2.449 -0.192 -0.560 0.034 0.870
(0.198)*** (0.190) (0.190)*** (0.018)* (0.204)***
ln(Labor Force) 0.792 1.593 1.426 0.993 0.763
(0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.003)*** (0.029)***
Constant -5.793 -10.470 -9.293 -0.011 -5.225
(0.267)*** (0.256)*** (0.256)*** (0.025) (0.274)***
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
R-squared 0.38 0.69 0.63 0.99 0.33
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: ln(1 + Number of Workers in Given Racial Group)
First Stage Coefficients
The two-stage weighted least squares regression in Column 1 of Table 3 has 42 endogenous
variables and an equal number of instruments. A table presenting all coefficients for these
42 first-stage regressions would be overwhelming. Instead, Table 9 provides the coefficient
of an industry’s RFIV in first-stage regressions of its own observed RF value, the standard
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error of this estimate, and the F-statistic for a test of joint significance of the instrumental
variables. Coefficients equalling one imply that predicted and observed values are identical.
Empirically, this does not occur, though standard errors indicate that the instruments are
strong predictors of observed diversity.
Table 9: First Stage Results of IV Regression.
Coefficient on 
Own Industry 
IV
Standard 
Error F( 46,  5947)
Advertising 1.267 (0.011)*** 326
Agriculture 0.591 (0.019)*** 33
Aircraft & Parts 0.797 (0.008)*** 234
Apparel 1.804 (0.016)*** 284
Bars & Restaurants 1.615 (0.015)*** 411
Colleges & Universities 1.044 (0.009)*** 441
Comp & Software Design 1.109 (0.011)*** 280
Computer Manufacturing 1.021 (0.012)*** 172
Construction 1.180 (0.014)*** 275
Drugs & Chemicals 1.034 (0.010)*** 263
Education, Non-College 0.866 (0.010)*** 265
Electrical Machinery 1.129 (0.009)*** 342
Engineering & Architecture 0.767 (0.007)*** 317
Entertainment & Recreation 1.412 (0.010)*** 496
Fabricated Metals 0.541 (0.010)*** 73
Finance 1.186 (0.010)*** 371
Food & Beverage Manuf 1.151 (0.018)*** 102
Food, Drug, & Alc Retail 1.692 (0.015)*** 384
General Retail 1.532 (0.013)*** 385
Health Services 0.934 (0.010)*** 320
Hotels 1.108 (0.013)*** 166
Insurance 1.073 (0.009)*** 347
Legal Services 1.144 (0.009)*** 357
Mining 0.471 (0.010)*** 50
Motor Vehicles & Engines 0.489 (0.008)*** 83
Other Business Services 1.505 (0.011)*** 507
Other Durables 0.864 (0.009)*** 232
Other Machinery 0.755 (0.009)*** 164
Other Non-Durables 1.458 (0.018)*** 165
Other Professional Srvcs 1.069 (0.008)*** 436
Other Retail 1.625 (0.014)*** 416
Paper Products 0.840 (0.009)*** 194
Personal Services 0.925 (0.011)*** 175
Public Administration 0.830 (0.010)*** 222
Raw Durables 0.684 (0.009)*** 150
Real Estate 1.252 (0.007)*** 754
Repair Shops 1.119 (0.009)*** 355
Telecommunications 1.419 (0.012)*** 353
Textiles 0.502 (0.016)*** 32
Transportation 1.475 (0.012)*** 401
Utilities 0.715 (0.007)*** 217
Wholesale Trade 1.442 (0.011)*** 448
*** Coefficient significant at 1%
O*NET Values
O*NET provides information about hundreds of characteristics for over 800 occupations in
the U.S. economy. Each O*NET variable used in this paper takes ordinal values ranging
from 1 to 5, with 5 representing the highest score for a particular characteristic. I rescale
these scores into percentile values based upon the year 2000 distribution of characteristics
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across occupations. Table 10 provides examples of occupations receiving percentiles near the
minimum, median, and maximum points of the distribution.
Table 10: Examples of Occupations with High, Median, and Low O*NET Values.
Importance of: High Values (1) Median Values (0.5) Low Values (0)
Making Decisions and 
Solving Problems   
Chief Executives and 
Legislators
Designers Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile 
Installers, and Tapers
Podiatrists Procurement Clerks Models, Demonstrators, and 
Product Promoters
Thinking Creatively   Architects Insurance Underwriters Insulation Workers
Artists and Related Workers Physical Therapists Office Machine Operators, 
Except Computer
Customer and Personal 
Service    
Interviewers Bailiffs, Correctional Officers, 
and Jailers
Graders and Sorters, 
Agricultural Products
Tellers Telecommunications Line 
Installers and Repairers
Machine Feeders and 
Offbearers
Work With Work Group or 
Team 
Engineering Technicians, 
Except Drafters
Meeting and Convention 
Planners
Mail Clerks and Mail Machine 
Operators, Except Postal 
Service
Food Service Managers Market and Survey 
Researchers
Private Detectives and 
Investigators
After assigning O*NET percentile values to occupation categories (as described in the
text), I create weighted average values for each industry and year. Table 11 displays the
industry-specific O*NET values for the year 2000.
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Table 11: O*NET Values by Industry, 2000.
Industry
Making 
Decisions and 
Solving 
Problems   
Thinking 
Creatively   
Customer and 
Personal 
Service    
Work With 
Work Group or 
Team 
Advertising 0.533 0.687 0.491 0.397
Agriculture 0.601 0.495 0.316 0.203
Aircraft & Parts 0.645 0.633 0.316 0.442
Apparel Retail 0.436 0.393 0.626 0.448
Bars & Restaurants 0.308 0.345 0.617 0.498
Colleges & Universities 0.570 0.712 0.394 0.430
Computer & Software Design 0.765 0.782 0.288 0.379
Computer Manufacturing 0.676 0.658 0.347 0.464
Construction 0.415 0.541 0.315 0.416
Drugs & Chemicals 0.563 0.561 0.362 0.490
Education, Non-College 0.556 0.728 0.451 0.440
Electrical Machinery 0.596 0.568 0.306 0.472
Engineering & Architecture 0.684 0.748 0.348 0.512
Entertainment & Rec Services 0.510 0.539 0.495 0.475
Fabricated Metals 0.515 0.504 0.268 0.423
Finance 0.590 0.577 0.575 0.572
Food & Beverage Manuf 0.468 0.466 0.304 0.420
Food, Drug, & Alcohol Retail 0.399 0.399 0.530 0.592
General Retail 0.408 0.367 0.582 0.477
Health Services 0.614 0.460 0.695 0.631
Hotels 0.311 0.332 0.453 0.379
Insurance 0.546 0.398 0.629 0.417
Legal Services 0.597 0.418 0.464 0.270
Mining 0.498 0.537 0.314 0.516
Motor Vehicles & Engines 0.542 0.512 0.263 0.440
Other Business Services 0.492 0.505 0.462 0.452
Other Durables 0.554 0.534 0.322 0.456
Other Machinery 0.524 0.502 0.273 0.406
Other Non-Durables 0.528 0.503 0.297 0.453
Other Professional Services 0.554 0.599 0.477 0.485
Other Retail 0.450 0.445 0.569 0.460
Paper Products 0.505 0.560 0.389 0.434
Personal Services 0.295 0.500 0.579 0.223
Public Administration 0.572 0.528 0.478 0.529
Raw Durables 0.483 0.480 0.246 0.418
Real Estate 0.423 0.435 0.616 0.386
Repair Shops 0.426 0.552 0.566 0.472
Telecommunications 0.574 0.546 0.476 0.422
Textiles 0.507 0.466 0.241 0.409
Transportation 0.425 0.428 0.421 0.468
Utilities 0.513 0.529 0.378 0.478
Wholesale Trade 0.454 0.466 0.487 0.444
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